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Abstract
The CDM is a project-based mechanism to promote
flexibility in mitigation climate change, by promot-
ing investment in mitigation projects in developing
countries. There has been concern about potential
perverse incentives for developing countries like
South Africa not to adopt progressive national poli-
cies, fearing that CDM projects implementing such
policy would no longer be additional. The CDM
rules on additionality require that emissions are
reduced ‘below those that would have occurred in
the absence of the registered CDM project activity’.
The paper shows that recent decisions by the CDM
Executive Board make it clear that such perverse
incentives will not be created. The paper suggests
concrete interpretations of this guidance for two
possible project types. Projects implementing
national policies that promote zero- or low-carbon
emission technologies (e.g. South Africa’s renew-
able energy target) can still go through the CDM
process. Where there are local regulations, as for
landfill gas, projects would not be ruled out entirely,
but would receive credit for the difference between
actual methane capture and that needed to meet
local safety, health and environmental standards.
The author concludes that projects implementing
progressive energy policies are still eligible for CDM
investment.
Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism, CDM
Executive Board, renewable energy projects, South
Africa
Introduction
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) establishes a Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC 1997). The CDM is a
project-based mechanism to promote flexibility in
mitigation climate change, by promoting invest-
ment in mitigation projects in developing countries.
Specifically, it allows industrialised countries to
meet part of their emissions reductions targets by
investing in developing countries. It is also sup-
posed to contribute to sustainable development in
developing countries, which act as hosts to the
projects. The Marrakech Accords (UNFCCC 2001)
– agreed at COP-7 in 2001 – launched the CDM in
principle, although ratification by sufficient coun-
tries is still required to formally bring the Kyoto
Protocol and its mechanisms into force. The CDM
modalities and procedures (hereafter simply ‘CDM
rules’) address important technical issues that affect
project development, including additionality, base-
lines and monitoring. 
The paper focuses on a particular issue within
this set of rules, namely the treatment of national
policies. The potential problem is that national poli-
cies might require the implementation of measures
that reduce GHG emissions and thus no longer be
additional. This would create a perverse incentive
for developing countries like South Africa not to
adopt progressive national policies. The paper
shows that recent decisions by the CDM Executive
Board make it clear that such perverse incentives
will not be created. The implications for South
Africa are that the CDM can contribute to new mit-
igation policies, such as the recent setting of a
renewable energy target (DME 2003). The paper
also considers more specific recommendations that
could help operationalise the guidance from the
Executive Board. 
National policies in the CDM rules
The CDM rules contain detailed procedures for cal-
culating baselines. Baselines are scenarios of the
emissions that would have happened without the
CDM project. They are projections of what would
have happened in the ‘counter-factual’ situation,
i.e. if the project did not occur. For example, if
South Africa does not build a wind farm to gener-
ate electricity, it might build a coal-fired, gas or
nuclear power plant instead. The baseline as speci-
fied in paragraph 44 of the CDM rules is the ‘sce-
nario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic
emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that
would occur in the absence of the proposed project
activity’ (UNFCCC 2001). Substantial technical
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work has been conducted to establish baselines
internationally and for South Africa. Readers are
referred to this literature for a more general discus-
sion of baselines (OECD, IEA 2000; Lazarus et al
2000; Lazarus et al 2001; Ellis et al 2001; Winkler
et al 2001; Kartha & Lazarus 2002; Martens et al;
2001; Winkler & Thorne 2002; Sathaye et al 2003). 
The focus in this paper is on the treatment of
national policies in relation to baselines and addi-
tionality. Paragraph 45(e) of the CDM rules states
that a baseline shall be established ‘taking into
account relevant national and/or sectoral policies
and circumstances, such as sectoral reform initia-
tives, local fuel availability, power sector expansion
plans, and the economic situation in the project sec-
tor’ (UNFCCC 2001). The concern underlying this
provision is that proposed CDM projects might no
longer be considered ‘additional’ under the CDM
rules. The CDM rules on additionality specify that ‘a
CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are
reduced below those that would have occurred in
the absence of the registered CDM project activity’.
There has been much discussion on the interpreta-
tion of these rules and whether they require only
showing a reduction in emissions of the project
against the baseline scenario, or also showing that
the project is not itself the baseline – in simple
terms, that the project is business-as-usual and
would have happened anyway. 
If national policy already requires the measures
that lead to emission reductions, one might consid-
er that it would have happened without the CDM
project. An example of this concern is expressed by
Christiana Figueres (2004):
The current interpretation of additionality is a
disincentive for developing countries to develop
decarbonising policies. If climate-friendly sec-
toral policies are put in place, projects are con-
sidered non-additional and therefore excluded
from the CDM. 
Recent guidance by the Executive Board, however,
has made clear that such a perverse incentive is to
be avoided. 
Executive Board: no perverse incentives
At its eleventh meeting, the Executive Board1 pro-
vided general guidance that, taking into account,
relevant national and/or sectoral policies, should
not create perverse incentives, that is, discourage
developing countries from implementing policies
that reduce emissions by turning projects imple-
menting these policies not eligible to CDM. It
requested its ‘panel on methodologies for baselines
and monitoring’ (Meth Panel) to develop recom-
mendations how this could be operationalised,
bearing in mind:
that taking into account relevant national and/or
sectoral policies when establishing baseline sce-
narios is not to create perverse incentives which
may impact the host country Parties in con-
tributing to the ultimate objective of the
Convention’ (UNFCCC 2003). 
Given this guidance, the implications for South
Africa are clear. The Board has sent a clear signal
that it does not wish to create any perverse incen-
tives to discourage progressive national policy. 
For example, South Africa has recently adopted
a target for renewable energy. In 2003, the
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) pub-
lished a White Paper on Renewable Energy. The
new policy document intends to:
give much needed thrust to renewable energy; a
policy that envisages a range of measures to
bring about integration of renewable energies
into the mainstream energy economy. To
achieve this aim, Government is setting as its
target 10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable
energy contribution to final energy consumption
by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass,
wind, solar and small-scale hydro. The renew-
able energy is to be utilised for power generation
and non-electric technologies such as solar
water heating and bio-fuels. This is approxi-
mately 4% (1667 MW) of the projected electric-
ity demand for 2013 (41539 MW). This is in
addition to the estimated existing (in 2000)
renewable energy contribution of 115 278
GWh/annum (mainly from fuelwood and
waste). 
The last sentence makes it clear that this amount is
additional to current use of renewable energy, most
of which is biomass. 
The broad guidance implies that renewable
energy projects in South Africa would be eligible for
CDM investment, even if they are implementing an
aspirational national target. Making such projects
ineligible would constitute a ‘perverse incentive’,
which the Executive Board says is to be avoided. 
This should not be misunderstood to imply that
renewable energy projects are automatically addi-
tional. Renewable energy projects in South Africa
will still have to go through the CDM validation
process like any others, but should be considered
ineligible a priori, simply because they are imple-
menting national policy. The implication is that
CDM investment can still be used to implement a
national renewable energy target. The broad guid-
ance from the Executive Board provides a clear sig-
nal, although the detailed interpretation will be fur-
ther elaborated. 
A similar argument would apply to energy effi-
ciency. Government’s draft strategy for energy effi-
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ciency sets a ‘national target for energy savings, of
at least 12%, to be achieved by 2014’, expressed as
a reduction relative to project national energy
demand for that year according to the baseline sce-
nario in the Integrated Energy Plan (DME 2004).
The strategy seeks to achieve this overall reduction
through enabling instruments and interventions
including economic and legislative means, infor-
mation activities, energy labels, energy perform-
ance standards, energy audits, energy manage-
ment and the promotion of efficient technolo-
gies. 
CDM projects implementing this policy should
not automatically be ruled out as non-additional,
following the Executive Board guidance. The strat-
egy specifically makes clear that the baseline sce-
nario is ‘business-as-usual’ energy consumption, so
that autonomous energy efficiency is included. To
achieve the 12% target, additional effort is needed,
some of which could be benefit from CDM invest-
ment. Such projects would need to go through the
full CDM project cycle, but are not ruled out a pri-
ori. 
Implementing policies in developing
countries
A further distinction supporting this view is that
between the existence of a policy and its imple-
mentation. In many developing countries, policies
that are on the statute books are not implemented,
with one of the key reasons being the scarcity of
capital. 
A methodology for baselines and monitoring of
emissions reductions from municipal solid waste
(MSW) management in India was approved by the
Executive Board at its April 2004 meeting (EB13).
In this case, the Indian Ministry of Environment and
Forests has issued regulations for MSW in 2000.
The Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and
Handling) Rules (2000) were to be in effect from
December 2003. However, the project participants
argued – and the Meth Panel and Executive Board
accepted – that environmental regulations are poor-
ly enforced with financial resources for their imple-
mentation are lacking. In other words, the baseline
scenario starts with non-compliance with the new
MSW rules and only gradually to MSW disposal
sites moved away from with unmanaged means of
waste management. 
The baseline scenario is a gradual improvement
over time, to options required by MSW Manage-
ment Rule (2000), namely (1) incineration, (2)
compost, (3) sanitary land-filling, (4) biomethana-
tion or their combination. It is the implementation
of policy that is the considered the baseline sce-
nario, not the existence of the policy. However, the
methodology draws a line by saying that compli-
ance (at the level of the state within India) must be
monitored. If compliance with MSW rules exceeds
50%, the project activity shall receive no further
credit, since the assumption that the policy is not
enforced is no longer tenable. If more than half of
the disposal sites in the relevant state comply with
the rules, it can be assumed that this is business-as-
usual.
Specifying the broad guidance
The broad guidance provided by the Executive
Board sends a clear signal. More specific recom-
mendations on how this could be operationalised
are needed. While these will be developed by the
Meth Panel and approved finally by the Executive
Board, some possible options emerge from the dis-
cussion above. The following examples from the
South African context seem particularly relevant: 
• As argued for the example of South Africa’s
renewable energy target, projects implementing
national policies that promote zero- or low-car-
bon emission technologies should be eligible for
the CDM. Furthermore, to avoid the perverse
incentive of the CDM projects lowering the base-
line of the country, it might be possible to
exclude plants built under such a policy from the
baseline for a crediting period. This would be 7
or 10 years, depending on the choice of credit-
ing period by the project participants. Seven-
year crediting periods can be renewed twice, but
in the 2nd and 3 rd period, previous CDM projects
might become part of the baseline. 
• A similar approach could be taken with energy
efficiency projects, allowing them to be eligible
for CDM investment if their effort goes beyond
autonomous energy efficiency improvements.
As outlined above, this assumption is built into
the formulation of the national target. 
• A different situation arises with landfill gas (LFG)
projects. A government may be reluctant to
adopt local regulations for methane (motivated
by health and safety concerns), again with the
concern that this might render LFG projects
non-additional. One approach would be to clar-
ify that projects can still claim credit for level of
methane capture above that required to meet
local standards. Projects would not be ruled out
entirely, but would receive credit for the differ-
ence between actual methane capture and that
needed to meet safety, health and local environ-
mental (SHE) standards. There are several
approved methodologies for landfill gas proj-
ects, and the Meth Panel is in the process of con-
solidating these during 2004.
The above are possible short-term solutions to
the concern about perverse incentives. Taking a
broader view, one might even ask whether the
CDM is (yet) large enough to be a major factor in
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determining national policies, in many cases. While
some $800 million of investment have been allo-
cated to CDM projects (Ellis et al 2004), it remains
small relative to other investment flows, both for-
eign and domestic. The current project-based archi-
tecture of the CDM still does not allow for policy
interventions that are not project-based (e.g. price
changes). The problem of perverse incentives can
only be resolved overall, if broader policy measures
also become eligible for the CDM. Such questions
are more likely to be resolved in the longer-term,
with approaches to mitigation in developing coun-
tries such as sectoral CDM (Santiago & Figueres
2002) or ‘sustainable development policies and
measures’ Winkler et al 2002). These approaches
allow the inclusion of programmes and price
changes for investment in mitigation – changes
which do not have to be confined to physical proj-
ect boundaries. 
Conclusion
Concerns have been raised that the CDM might
induce countries not to promulgate progressive pol-
icy, or even repeal existing laws so that projects can
receive CDM investment. Such concerns about
‘perverse incentives’ should have been allayed by
the recent guidance from the Executive Board. 
The broad guidance is to be elaborated into
more specific recommendations. Zero-emissions
technologies may be excluded in pursuance of
national policy for the first crediting period. For
local regulations of LFG, the difference between
actual methane capture and the amount needed to
meet SHE standards could be credited. The
Executive Board can be expected to provide
authoritative interpretations in due course. For
South Africa in particular, it seems apparent that the
implementation of its renewable energy target and
other progressive policies are still eligible for CDM
investment. 
Notes
1. Executive Board reports are downloadable from
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Meetings.
2. The proposed methodology (NM 32) can be viewed
at http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/process. The
final approved version is expected to be on the web-
site (http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/approved.
html) later in 2004. See previous note for EB meeting
reports.
3. For example, see http://www.cseindia.org/html/eyou
/climate/atmospher.htm
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